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A Remark on Voters’ Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy
Author(s) -
De sinopoli Francesco,
Turrini Alessandro
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9779.00093
Subject(s) - rationality , dominance (genetics) , iterated function , democracy , voting , economics , mathematical economics , microeconomics , set (abstract data type) , positive economics , econometrics , political science , computer science , mathematics , law , biology , politics , mathematical analysis , biochemistry , gene , programming language
Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance restricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate’s (1997) citizen‐candidate model of representative democracy.