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An Allocation Rule with Wealth‐Regressive Tax Rates
Author(s) -
Sanver M. Remzi
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9779.00088
Subject(s) - economics , pareto principle , nash equilibrium , microeconomics , pareto optimal , pareto efficiency , general equilibrium theory , mathematical economics , multi objective optimization , mathematical optimization , mathematics , operations management
We introduce a public good allocation rule whose direct implementation by asking agents their endowments leads to Nash equilibrium outcomes—always Pareto dominating voluntary contributions outcomes. Although the Nash equilibrium allocations induced by this rule are not Pareto optimal in general, they are so in two‐person economies.