An Aristotelian Defence of Affirmative Action: Alasdair MacIntyre, Sandra Day O'Connor and Grutter v. Bollinger

Abstract We argue that Alasdair MacIntyre's description of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor as an exemplar of practical reasoning, who envisions the contextual and consensual balancing of different goods according to the further good of the American social order, enables a reinterpretation of O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger , the landmark affirmative action decision. Grutter has been criticised for arbitrarily claiming that diversity is a compelling governmental interest, giving excessive deference to university admissions offices, and including a sunset provision. These criticisms, we argue, are weakened if the decision and the meaning of ‘diversity’ are reinterpreted through a neo‐Aristotelian lens. Further, looking at Grutter , we defend O'Connor from MacIntyre's criticism that she cannot radically critique the American social order.