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Cabinet Formation in Coalition Systems
Author(s) -
Carmignani Fabrizio
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
scottish journal of political economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.4
H-Index - 46
eISSN - 1467-9485
pISSN - 0036-9292
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9485.00201
Subject(s) - negotiation , cabinet (room) , ideology , outcome (game theory) , economics , politics , sample (material) , microeconomics , econometrics , political science , engineering , law , mechanical engineering , chemistry , chromatography
Theoretical and empirical issues concerning the political bargaining process over cabinet formation in coalition systems are addressed in this paper. A set of theoretical predictions is tested using a sample of 13 western European countries observed throughout the period 1950–1995. It appears that the formation delay is increasing in the degree of ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners and that the share of portfolios secured by the formateur is decreasing in the degree of complexity of the bargaining environment. A few factors affecting the degree to which the outcome of the negotiation process can be defined as balanced are also identified.