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Corruption and Reputation
Author(s) -
Andrianova Svetlana
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
scottish journal of political economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.4
H-Index - 46
eISSN - 1467-9485
pISSN - 0036-9292
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9485.00197
Subject(s) - reputation , honesty , language change , value (mathematics) , matching (statistics) , economics , microeconomics , political science , law , computer science , art , statistics , literature , mathematics , machine learning
This paper examines corruption in a random matching game where past actions are imperfectly observed and players have the option to continue trading with their existing partners. It shows that the effect of individual reputations for honesty may outweigh the effect of a bad collective reputation depending on the expected value of a continued match relative to the corruption gain.