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Prices and Information Under Imperfect Competition
Author(s) -
Andersen Torben M.,
Hviid Morten
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
scottish journal of political economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.4
H-Index - 46
eISSN - 1467-9485
pISSN - 0036-9292
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9485.00131
Subject(s) - duopoly , economics , imperfect competition , private information retrieval , perfect information , microeconomics , competition (biology) , imperfect , product (mathematics) , product market , cournot competition , computer science , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , geometry , computer security , mathematics , incentive , biology
Imperfectly competitive product markets cannot be informationally efficient as private information has strategic implications interfering with price adjustment. This is illustrated in a duopoly model with sequential price setting where private information either leads to prices not being adjusted to all available information or to adjusted but biased prices.