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Testing Employment Determination in Unionised Economies as a Repeated Game
Author(s) -
Rica Sara De la,
Espinosa Marìa Paz
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
scottish journal of political economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.4
H-Index - 46
eISSN - 1467-9485
pISSN - 0036-9292
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9485.00049
Subject(s) - economics , wage , wage bargaining , work (physics) , empirical research , collective bargaining , labour economics , test (biology) , microeconomics , economy , engineering , mechanical engineering , paleontology , philosophy , epistemology , biology
This paper is an empirical analysis of alternative bargaining theories of wage and employment determination. Using data from manufacturing sectors of the Spanish economy, we find that unions and firms are not myopic and take dynamic considerations into account in the bargaining process. This work is an empirical test of the bargaining model in Espinosa and Rhee (1989) and provides support for their conclusions.

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