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Timing in Opposition Party Support under Minority Government
Author(s) -
Müller Melanie,
König Pascal D.
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
scandinavian political studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.65
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1467-9477
pISSN - 0080-6757
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9477.12195
Subject(s) - opposition (politics) , dilemma , commit , optimal distinctiveness theory , political science , voting , public support , political economy , public administration , law , economics , politics , social psychology , psychology , philosophy , epistemology , database , computer science
Opposition parties under minority governments find themselves in a fundamental dilemma. They are competing with other parties, including the government, for electoral support while also having a common responsibility to make stable government work. This dilemma is especially pronounced for opposition parties signing support agreements with the government. While not formally in a coalition, they nonetheless publicly commit to supporting a government. They may thus be concerned about losing distinctiveness and have an interest in strategically timing cooperation with the minority government. The present paper tests whether this is the case using data on opposition party voting on committee proposals from 23 years of Swedish minority governments between 1991 and 2018. The findings indicate that support parties are less likely to support the government towards the beginning and end of the election cycle, that is, when public attention is intense – a pattern that is not observable for other opposition parties.