In Search of the Government in Local Government: Coalition Agreements and Office Payoffs in Norway

The politics of European local government is often assumed to take place in a rather depoliticised and non‐partisan environment. This feature is especially apparent in Norway, where local government institutions are designed to create a high degree of consensus and accommodation. No local cabinet takes office, and therefore no formal roles of a majority government and an opposition are offered. This paper tells a different story, however. Following the 1999 elections many municipalities are now experiencing partisan cooperation based on binding political agreements. In these cases the common practice of proportional distribution of the important political positions is replaced with a ‘winner takes all’ principle, as only the majority constellation is rewarded with office payoffs. Given that this form of cooperation is the closest analogue to any cabinet formation at the local level, it is clearly of interest to uncover under which conditions it occurs. The empirical analysis therefore uses variation in structural, socioeconomic and political characteristics to predict the local coalition behaviour. The empirical model captures some important determinants in the variation of structural characteristics, and, as expected, explicit and binding coalition agreements are found in the large and central municipalities. Socioeconomic setting is furthermore important, since municipalities with a high degree of financial autonomy and poor policy performance experience this kind of formalised cooperation more frequently. Systematic effects are also found for political characteristics, with electoral volatility, party fragmentation and functional organisation models all increasing the probability of coalition agreements.