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Marriage Settlements
Author(s) -
Laferrere Anne
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9442.00256
Subject(s) - wife , spouse , economics , inheritance (genetic algorithm) , fertility , settlement (finance) , property (philosophy) , asset (computer security) , disadvantage , human settlement , labour economics , demographic economics , microeconomics , sociology , law , population , payment , demography , finance , geography , political science , biochemistry , chemistry , philosophy , computer science , gene , computer security , archaeology , epistemology
French couples may choose between two types of marriage settlements governing asset ownership after a divorce or inheritance: common property or separate property. A cooperative model considers the marriage contract as a means of providing for widowhood of the less endowed spouse. A second model addresses the probability of divorce and the production of a marriage good. The common property contract then becomes a means of inducing the wife to invest in the marriage good. Choice of contract, labor supply and fertility are simultaneous. Empirically we find that characteristics of the spouses such as relative age or differences in endowments influence the choice. So do the expected number of children and the wife's labor supply decision. This last decision is also shown to be influenced by the chosen settlement, while fertility is not. JEL classification : J 12; J 4; K 12