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Pollution Taxation and Revenue Recycling under Monopoly Unions
Author(s) -
Strand Jon
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9442.00135
Subject(s) - subsidy , monopoly , pollution , economics , dividend , revenue , tax revenue , investment (military) , labour economics , natural resource economics , public economics , microeconomics , market economy , finance , ecology , politics , political science , biology , law
A model where a given number of firms determine their pollution‐reducing production technologies upon establishment and workers form monopoly unions is used to study the possibility of “double dividends”, i.e., simultaneous reductions in pollution and increases in employment, when the pollution tax is increased, and tax revenues recycled, in alternative ways. In all cases pollution is reduced. When output is subsidized, the effect of a pollution tax increase on employment is always neutral. When employment, and investments, are subsidized, employment increases when investments are, respectively, relatively insensitive and sensitive to pollution taxes. Of the three subsidy instruments, the employment subsidy is always the most, and the investment subsidy the least efficient solution.