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One Cow, One Vote?
Author(s) -
Albæk Svend,
Schultz Christian
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9442.00083
Subject(s) - investment (military) , voting , variety (cybernetics) , production (economics) , microeconomics , economics , investment decisions , majority rule , simple (philosophy) , business , law , political science , computer science , epistemology , politics , artificial intelligence , philosophy
We study investment decisions in a farmers' cooperative. Farmers sell their products through the cooperative. Before production takes place the cooperative has to decide on an investment. We study whether voting on investment leads to efficient investment decisions. The answer depends on how the number of votes and the cost of the investment are distributed among the farmers. It is shown that in a variety of settings, there is no reason to suppose that voting rules favoring large farmers —“one cow, one vote” rules — are more efficient than simple majority rule.