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Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship[Note 1. The first version of this paper was written at ...]
Author(s) -
Strausz Roland
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9442.00078
Subject(s) - collusion , principal (computer security) , commit , supervisor , microeconomics , economics , signal (programming language) , mathematical economics , computer science , computer security , management , database , programming language
We describe a principal–supervisor–agent relationship in which agent and supervisor may collude. To prevent collusion, the principal may contract on a noisy signal which is correlated with the occurrence of collusion. When the signal is informative enough, the principal uses it and no collusion occurs in equilibrium. These contracts, however, are ex post inefficient and are only optimal if the principal can commit not to renegotiate. With renegotiation it is never optimal for the principal to prevent collusion and, at the same time, condition contracts on the signal. In fact, when the signal is informative enough collusion occurs in equilibrium.