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Entry Policy and Entry Subsidies
Author(s) -
Reitzes James D.,
Grawe Oliver R.
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
review of international economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.513
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-9396
pISSN - 0965-7576
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9396.00195
Subject(s) - subsidy , incentive , economics , deterrence theory , marginal cost , complete information , free entry , microeconomics , barriers to entry , international economics , market structure , market economy , physics , nuclear physics
Optimal entry policy is considered in markets served by both domestic and foreign firms. Compared with the prior entry literature, introducing foreign producers as market participants reduces incentives for entry deterrence and enhances incentives for entry subsidization. Incentives are changed because entry produces “terms‐of‐trade” gains. The optimal entry subsidy is analyzed under complete and incomplete information regarding the entrant’s costs. Incomplete cost information creates differences in the optimal subsidy for domestic and foreign entrants, with foreign entrants relatively less subsidized. Domestic entrants with low marginal costs are oversubsidized and those with high marginal costs are undersubsidized.