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Democracy out of Reason? Comment on Rainer Forst's “The Rule of Reasons”
Author(s) -
Gosepath Stefan
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9337.00187
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , legitimacy , democracy , phenomenon , dissent , reciprocal , law and economics , rule of law , epistemology , philosophy , law , political science , sociology , politics , biochemistry , chemistry , linguistics
In my paper, I comment on Rainer Forst's paper in this issue. I raise doubts as to whether the justification of democracy emerges from a fundamental moral right to reciprocal and general justification, as Forst claims. His basic argument appears questionable because democracy is different from a “hypothetical‐consent‐conception” of moral legitimacy, which limits as well as enables democratic legitimacy. The former cannot, however, justify the latter through an argument centered on self‐government: Such an argument relies heavily on the possibility of consensus, thus neglecting the crucial phenomenon of disagreement or dissent. As a result of not adequately dealing with this phenomenon, the argument is unable to account for the basic democratic principle of majority rule as the remedy at hand.