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Legal Obligation and Aesthetic Ideals: A Renewed Legal Positivist Theory of Law's Normativity
Author(s) -
Culver Keith C.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9337.00177
Subject(s) - obligation , law , positivism , order (exchange) , legal positivism , philosophy of law , legal realism , legal norm , sociology , philosophy , political science , legal profession , epistemology , comparative law , finance , economics
This article supports H. L. A. Hart's “any reasons” thesis (defended consistently from the first edition of The Concept of Law in 1961 to the Postscript to the second edition of 1994) that legal officials may accept law for any reasons, including non‐moral reasons. I develop a conception of non‐moral aesthetic ideals of official conduct which may provide legal officials with reasons to accept and apply even morally iniquitous law. I use this conception in order to rebut Gerald Postema's and Joseph Raz's criticisms of Hart's view, and suggest that my revisions offer reasons for renewed confidence in Hart's account of law's normativity.