A Philosophical Approach to Norm Logic

The author outlines his views on the essence of philosophical logic. There are two means of philosophical argumentation: intuition and analysis of the problem situation under examination. Logical intuition can be replaced by improved intuition based on new intellectual constructions. Then the author explains—in opposition to von Wright—the main philosophical traits of his conception of norm logic. The structure of the information processing determining action justifies the application of dichotomous semantics in action theory and in practical philosophy. The theory of action and institutions is based on three anthropological features of man: our capacity of acting, our being a zoon politikon , and our capacity to form institutions. These features determine our ontology, our semantics and the logics of practical thinking. The action‐theoretical approach leads to a formal and finalistic theory of action in which action is not only analysed as an element of the norm content, but as the essential basis of the whole field of practical philosophy. In the frame of this action theory a conception of freedom of will is provided which does not contrast with determinism. The formalism of action is applied in two different problem situations: in action deliberation and in motive interpretation. Jørgensen's dilemma is discussed and overcome by the introduction of a generalised notion of inference. Deontic logic is confronted with the idea of a genuine logic of norms. The main principles of norm logic are discussed and a normative conditional is introduced. Von Wright's conception of a genuine norm logic is confronted with the present author's conception. The author shows that norm‐logical skepticism would be detrimental to analytical jurisprudence.