Physicalism, Nothing Buttery, and Supervenience

I consider the position (which I call‘the triad’) according to which physicalism is a reductive claim which is capturable in terms of the idea (the ‘ nothing buttery ’ idea) that there is nothing but/nothing over and above the physical, an idea which, in its turn, is meant to be capturable in terms of a determinate form of supervenience . (Physicalism is then meant to be capturable in terms of the form of supervenience in question.) I argue that there is a tension in the triad. The notion of ‘nothing buttery’ required has features which can't be captured by the supervenience of the triad. Hence, one cannot have both physicalism as nothing‐buttery‐reductive and physicalism as supervenience of the kind in question. If one wants to hold onto the idea of physicalism as nothing‐buttery‐reductive, one must be prepared to identify physicalism with a much stronger claim than one might have originally thought, a claim that can't be captured by the supervenience of the triad.