Infanticide and the Right to Life

Michael Tooley defends infanticide by analysing ‘ A has a right to X’ as roughly synonymous with ‘If A desires X , then others are under a prima facie obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him [or her] of it.’ An infant who cannot conceive of himself or herself as a continuing subject of experiences cannot desire to continue existing. Hence, on Tooley’s analysis, killing the infant is not impermissible, for it does not go against any of the infant’s desires. However, Tooley’s argument in support of his analysis seems to justify, instead, a slightly more subtle analysis—namely, ‘ A has a right to X ’ is roughly extensionally equivalent with ‘Unless A expresses his or her desire that not‐ X , then others are under a prima facie obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him or her of X .’ But given this analysis, the infant’s purported lack of any capacity to conceive of himself or herself as a continuing subject of experiences implies that we cannot be released from any duty that we might have not to harm him or her. In short, Tooley’s argument in support of his analysis actually implies that infanticide may well be impermissible.