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Competition and Contracting in the Transition from CCT to Best Value: Towards a More Reflexive Regulation?
Author(s) -
VincentJones Peter
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
public administration
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.313
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1467-9299
pISSN - 0033-3298
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9299.00154
Subject(s) - best value , public sector , economics , enforcement , corporate governance , benchmarking , procurement , statutory law , reflexivity , business , general partnership , competition (biology) , best practice , public administration , finance , political science , marketing , sociology , management , economy , law , social science , ecology , biology
Following publication of the government’s proposals for a statutory framework of Best Value, and the introduction of regulations increasing the flexibility of CCT pending its abolition, this paper examines the relationship between the compulsory regime and its likely successor. First, the paper suggests that the Best Value frame‐work is likely to impose a range of regulatory, monitoring and enforcement constraints similar in effect to the formal requirements that operate under CCT. Continuity with Conservative policy will be reinforced practically through transitional arrangements for the gradual abolition of CCT and the phased introduction of its replacement. Second, the paper argues that contracting is likely to continue to have a significant role under the new regime as the natural adjunct to the voluntary competitive processes that will be the preferred management tools for securing improvements in service performance. Open tendering and public‐private sector partnership arrangements, both of which imply contractual governance, are given explicit priority in the consultation document over benchmarking, performance indicators and other comparative public management mechanisms. Third, the paper argues that local authorities are likely to want to retain and develop contracting arrangements that potentially permit a degree of control over service provision that might not be available were more radical service‐providing alternatives to be adopted, involving the complete transfer of functions outside the public sector and/or their vesting in independent companies. Finally, the paper assesses the transition from CCT to Best Value from the theoretical perspective of responsive and reflexive regulation. Following a brief account of the reflexive failures of CCT, the paper argues that, although the Best Value framework is characterized by inherently reflexive processes involving self‐review, consultation and standard‐setting, its relative success is likely to depend ultimately both on the tightness with which legislation is drafted and on the manner of its practical interpretation, implementation and enforcement.