Wittgenstein's Rule‐Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning

1. The past few years have seen a revival of interest in Kripke’s controversial reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks about rule-following. Thus, on the one hand, George Wilson has tried to defend Kripke’s claim that Wittgenstein can be understood as providing a sceptical solution to a sceptical problem about meaning – a solution which, though sceptical, can nonetheless, according to Wilson, yield a kind of semantic realism. On the other hand, John McDowell and other ‘new Wittgensteinians’ have attempted to show that Wittgenstein intended to dissolve, rather than solve, all philosophical problems about meaning and so intended to leave no room for any philosophical account of meaning whatsoever. It seems to me, however, that Wilson’s sceptical solution is more scepticism than solution and that McDowell’s quietism also leaves untouched a problem that really needs to be addressed. Moreover, I believe that Wittgenstein himself recognized this need. The problem I have in mind concerns the normativity and objectivity of meaning; it is different from the rule-following paradox, though we are led into the paradox by certain ways of trying to solve it. Contra McDowell, I shall argue that dissolving the paradox leaves the problem, and hence the need for constructive philosophy, still standing. But I shall also argue, contra Wilson, that it is only by