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Reasoning about Beliefs: A Human Specialization?
Author(s) -
Povinelli Daniel J.,
Giambrone Steve
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
child development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.103
H-Index - 257
eISSN - 1467-8624
pISSN - 0009-3920
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8624.00307
Subject(s) - deception , psychology , theory of mind , cognitive psychology , flexibility (engineering) , function (biology) , task (project management) , watson , suspect , cognitive science , cognition , developmental psychology , social psychology , evolutionary biology , artificial intelligence , computer science , statistics , mathematics , management , criminology , neuroscience , economics , biology
A recent meta‐analysis performed by Wellman, Cross, and Watson clears the air surrounding young children's performance on tests of false belief by showing that it is highly likely that there is some type of conceptual development between 3 and 5 years of age that supports improved task performance. The data concerning the evolutionary origin of these abilities, however, is considerably less clear. Nonetheless, there is some reason to suspect that theory of mind is unique to our species, and that its original function was to provide a more abstract level of describing ancient behavioral patterns (such as deception, reconciliation, and gaze following) — behaviors that humans share in common with many other species. Thus, the initial selective advantage of theory of mind may have been because it increased the flexibility of already‐existing behaviors, not because it generated scores of radically new ones.