Premium
Games in Dynamic‐Epistemic Logic
Author(s) -
Van Benthem Johan
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8586.00133
Subject(s) - perfect information , axiom , mathematical economics , outcome (game theory) , imperfect , computer science , equivalence (formal languages) , simple (philosophy) , matching (statistics) , representation (politics) , action (physics) , combinatorial game theory , language game , epistemology , game theory , theoretical computer science , sequential game , mathematics , linguistics , discrete mathematics , political science , philosophy , statistics , geometry , physics , quantum mechanics , politics , law
The author discusses games of both perfect and imperfect information at two levels of structural detail: players’ local actions, and their global powers for determining outcomes of the game. Matching logical languages are proposed for both. In particular, at the ‘action level’, imperfect information games naturally model a combined ‘dynamic‐epistemic language’– and correspondences are found between special axioms in this language and particular modes of playing games with their information dynamics. At the ‘outcome level’, the paper presents suitable notions of game equivalence, and some simple representation results.