Premium
Strategic Choice of Quantity Stickiness and Stackelberg Leadership
Author(s) -
Hirokawa Midori,
Sasaki Dan
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8586.00115
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , duopoly , economics , microeconomics , production (economics) , mode (computer interface) , cournot competition , computer science , operating system
This paper re‐examines endogenous Stackelberg leader–follower relations by modelling an explicitly dynamic market. We analyze a twice‐repeated duopoly where, in the beginning, each firm chooses either a quantity‐sticky production mode or a quantity‐flexible production mode. The size of the market becomes observable after the first period. In the second period, a firm can adjust its quantity if and only if it has adopted the flexible mode. Hence, if one firm chooses the sticky mode whilst the other chooses the flexible mode, then they respectively play the roles of a Stackelberg leader and a Stackelberg follower in the second marketing period. Somewhat intriguing is the finding that such a Stackelberg‐like equilibrium can arise only when the relative weight of the pre‐Stackelberg first marketing period is sufficiently high, with time preferences being sufficiently strong.