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Equilibrium in Auction and Bargaining Markets When Agents Can Wait and Search
Author(s) -
Kultti Klaus,
Takalo Tuomas
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8586.00078
Subject(s) - microeconomics , economics , double auction , generalized second price auction , walrasian auction , auction theory , common value auction
The paper studies two market structures and two modes of trade. The agents, buyers and sellers, can choose whether to stay or search. The meetings take place randomly, and trades are consummated by auction or by bargaining. There are altogether four possible markets but in equilibrium at most two markets are active simultaneously. There is almost always a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium which consists of an auction market when the numbers of buyers and sellers differ greatly, and two simultaneous auction markets when the numbers are relatively close.