Information Asymmetries in the Hiring Process and the Risk of New Leader Dismissal: Insights from English Premier League Soccer Organizations | Zendy

Desai Malay N. | Zendy; Lockett Andy | Zendy; Paton David | Zendy

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Information Asymmetries in the Hiring Process and the Risk of New Leader Dismissal: Insights from English Premier League Soccer Organizations

Author(s) -

Desai Malay N.,

Lockett Andy,

Paton David

Publication year - 2018

Publication title -

british journal of management

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 2.407

H-Index - 108

eISSN - 1467-8551

pISSN - 1045-3172

DOI - 10.1111/1467-8551.12210

Subject(s) - dismissal , league , agency (philosophy) , process (computing) , sample (material) , public relations , information asymmetry , political science , business , management , accounting , sociology , economics , law , finance , computer science , social science , chemistry , physics , chromatography , astronomy , operating system

Why are some new leaders dismissed more quickly than others? Adopting agency theory logic, the authors examine how different succession contexts shape boards’ information asymmetries about a potential candidate's competencies in the hiring process, which influences the propensity of making poor hiring decisions and hence the risk of new leader dismissal. Employing duration analysis on a sample of 164 newly appointed leaders in the English premier league (1996–2014), the authors find that the risk of new leader dismissal is: (i) greater when the predecessor leader's exit was initiated by them rather than by the board; (ii) greater when following a longer‐tenured predecessor; and (iii) lower for outside successions compared with inside successions.

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