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Macroeconomic Constraints, Social Learning and Pay Bargaining in Europe
Author(s) -
Teague Paul
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
british journal of industrial relations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.665
H-Index - 70
eISSN - 1467-8543
pISSN - 0007-1080
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8543.00172
Subject(s) - discretion , socialization , collective bargaining , industrial relations , social dialogue , social partners , economics , social learning , european integration , fragmentation (computing) , european social model , process (computing) , economic system , political economy , political science , european union , market economy , labour economics , sociology , international economics , law , social science , pedagogy , management , computer science , operating system
This paper argues that European integration has constrained the discretion of industrial relations actors. The result has been not the widely predicted institutional fragmentation of collective bargaining, but a change in the functioning of these systems. At the same time, widespread ‘social dumping’ on the part of firms and member states has not materialized. The paper argues that the ‘race to the bottom’ thesis gives insufficient weight to the socialization mechanisms attached to the European integration process. Thus macroeconomic constraints and social learning processes are co‐mingling with one another in European industrial relations.

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