Premium
“Cold Storage”: British Policy and the Beginnings of the Irian Barat/West New Guinea Dispute
Author(s) -
Tarling Nicholas
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
australian journal of politics and history
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.123
H-Index - 23
eISSN - 1467-8497
pISSN - 0004-9522
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8497.00092
Subject(s) - new guinea , cold war , sovereignty , independence (probability theory) , political science , status quo , economic history , nationalism , government (linguistics) , indonesian , law , history , ethnology , politics , linguistics , statistics , philosophy , mathematics
During the struggle for independence, the British had sought to bring the Dutch and the Indonesians together: they wanted the friendship of the Dutch, their neighbours in Europe, but also believed that the Western powers could stay in Southeast Asia only if they came to terms with nationalism. The 1949 agreement that transferred sovereignty postponed the question of Irian Barat/West New Guinea. The British rather hoped that the Dutch would stay but,particularly as the Cold War intensified, did not wish to alienate the Indonesians. If no agreement could be reached on the issue, they wanted to put it into “cold storage” for a number of years. The Australian government was not satisfied with these policies. It opposed an Indonesian takeover, or indeed any Indonesian role in West New Guinea. Its aim was thepreservation of the status quo: even “cold storage” was insufficient.