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Transnational links in rhino poaching and the black‐market price of rhino horns
Author(s) -
Lopes Adrian A.
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
australian journal of agricultural and resource economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.683
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1467-8489
pISSN - 1364-985X
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8489.12286
Subject(s) - poaching , collusion , oligopoly , language change , french horn , supply chain , business , syndicate , corporate governance , industrial organization , economics , international trade , market economy , welfare , finance , marketing , wildlife , art , ecology , pedagogy , psychology , literature , biology
Rhino poaching in South Africa and India's major range states have been remarkably similar over time. Organised criminal syndicates manage an illegal supply chain of rhino horns from poachers, middlemen and corrupt authorities to East Asian black‐markets. In this paper, we use rhino poaching data from South Africa and India to examine the plausibility of transnational links and coordination in their supplies of rhino horns. We develop an innovative model of oligopolistic collusion in supply and find empirical evidence to support the theory, while controlling for rhino horn demand features, corruption, governance quality, and conservation policy. Furthermore, we propose an inventory management model of a criminal syndicate that controls the horn supply chain. The method retraces and forecasts black‐market prices and has potential applicability in estimating supply or demand elasticities. This paper is the first to suggest an oligopolistic feature of the poaching industry. It highlights the need to reorient conservation policy to account for possible coordination of rhino horn supplies between range states.