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Entry Deterrence and the Efficient Component Pricing Rule
Author(s) -
Williams Philip L.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
australian economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.308
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8462
pISSN - 0004-9018
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8462.00016
Subject(s) - deterrence theory , deterrence (psychology) , component (thermodynamics) , barriers to entry , economics , quarter (canadian coin) , industrial organization , business , microeconomics , law and economics , political science , market structure , law , history , physics , archaeology , thermodynamics
This note comments on the article ‘Entry and Entry Deterrence under the New Access Code’ by Amiti and Maddock, published in the Australian Economic Review, 3rd quarter 1996. It is found that Amiti and Maddock do not show that efficient component pricing by an incumbent vertically‐integrated monopolist will deter socially efficient entry of a new competitor.