Premium
Environmental information disclosure in capital raising
Author(s) -
Ji Zhiying,
Yu Xiao,
Yang Jiefei
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
australian economic papers
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1467-8454
pISSN - 0004-900X
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8454.12176
Subject(s) - business , information asymmetry , agency (philosophy) , government (linguistics) , raising (metalworking) , finance , capital market , capital (architecture) , accounting , linguistics , philosophy , geometry , mathematics , archaeology , epistemology , history
In 2010, the Chinese Government issued a policy to require enterprises to disclose environmental information. Using the environmental disclosure information of 204 Chinese listed companies in 20 polluting sectors over the period of 2011–2015, we find that managers tend to withhold environmental information and selectively disguise sensitive environmental information in the face of financial pressure, and where the disclosure of sensitive environmental information would significantly increase the cost of debt financing. Furthermore, agency conflicts and information asymmetry between managers and outside investors promote the managers' tendencies to withhold environmental information when facing financial pressure.