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Comparing Horizontal Mergers Under C ournot with B ertrand Competitions
Author(s) -
Nie Puyan
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
australian economic papers
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1467-8454
pISSN - 0004-900X
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8454.12053
Subject(s) - merge (version control) , competition (biology) , industrial organization , business , microeconomics , economics , computer science , biology , ecology , information retrieval
Taking the product substitutability into account, this paper considers the horizontal mergers under C ournot with B ertrand competition. Firstly, the big market size indicates non‐intention to merge. Secondly, independent goods indicate indifferences between the quantity competition and price competition. Finally, firms under quantity competition are more willing to merge than under price competition. The antitrust authority is more inclined to approve the merger under quantity competition than that under price competition.