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Product Liability: Beyond Class Action
Author(s) -
Sasaki Dan
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
australian economic papers
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1467-8454
pISSN - 0004-900X
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8454.00103
Subject(s) - punitive damages , liability , product liability , product (mathematics) , strict liability , lawsuit , business , payment , action (physics) , class action , economics , microeconomics , actuarial science , law and economics , law , finance , state (computer science) , political science , computer science , physics , geometry , mathematics , algorithm , quantum mechanics
Can punitive product liability enhance economic efficiency? A very simple economic theory, assuming that the probability and the degree of product dissatisfaction are functions only of the producer's not of the consumer's effort, is modelled and analysed in this paper. The qualitative conclusion hinges critically upon whether the legal liability is reflected on price determination. If the price of the product is insensitive to product liability legislation, then punitive liability beyond the class action (i.e., compensatory payments more than proportional representation of potentially dissatisfied consumers) can induce socially desirable levels of effort exerted by the producer firm. This affirmative effect disappears if the price fully reflects all the expected legal liabilities, whereby punitive liability tends to reduce economic efficiency by encouraging costly lawsuit.