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Import Quotas and Entry Deterrence
Author(s) -
Campbell Neil
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
australian economic papers
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1467-8454
pISSN - 0004-900X
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8454.00082
Subject(s) - deterrence theory , deterrence (psychology) , international economics , economics , barriers to entry , international trade , business , industrial organization , law and economics , political science , market structure , law
Using a simple version of the Milgrom and Roberts entry deterrence model, it is shown that adjusting a quota so that a greater volume of imports is allowed, can facilitate entry into the domestic industry. That is, the easing of a quota, can cause the domestic incumbent to shift from deterring entry to accommodating entry.