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Excess Capacity and Asymmetric Information in Developing Country Fisheries: The Malaysian Purse Seine Fishery
Author(s) -
Kirkley James E.,
Squires Dale,
Alam Mohammad Ferdous,
Ishak Haji Omar
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8276.00462
Subject(s) - principal (computer security) , fisheries management , business , fishery , moral hazard , developing country , sustainable development , fish <actinopterygii> , natural resource economics , environmental resource management , economics , incentive , economic growth , political science , computer science , fishing , microeconomics , law , biology , operating system
Excess capacity poses a problem in many developing country fisheries. These countries often pursue a development strategy aimed at expanding capacity under open access. Sustainable development, however, requires management. Principal‐agent issues from asymmetric information between the regulator and fishers, which potentially form serious obstacles to fisheries management, arise in the likely forms of management. This article discusses principal‐agent issues and examines the principal‐agent moral hazard issue, which is due to divorce of ownership and vessel operations. The article also illustrates a method for estimating capacity when information is limited. The Peninsular Malaysian purse seine fishery forms a case study.