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Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights: Causes and Consequences
Author(s) -
Giannakas Konstantinos
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8276.00312
Subject(s) - intellectual property , sanctions , enforcement , context (archaeology) , trips architecture , imperfect , deterrence theory , law and economics , business , economics , patent infringement , trips agreement , value (mathematics) , international trade , law , political science , paleontology , linguistics , philosophy , machine learning , parallel computing , computer science , biology
A game‐theoretic model of heterogeneous producers is developed to examine the economic causes and consequences of intellectual property right (IPR) infringement in the context of a small open developing economy. Analytical results show that complete deterrence of IPR infringement is not always economically optimal. IPR infringement affects economic welfare and has important ramifications for the pricing and adoption of the new technology (biotechnology). The quantitative nature of results depends on the labeling regime. If the TRIPs agreement follows the custom of retaliatory sanctions under GATT, IPR enforcement will remain imperfect and innovators' ability to obtain value for their biotech traits will be limited.