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Stop and Go Agricultural Policies with a Land Market
Author(s) -
Innes Robert
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.1111/1467-8276.00113
Subject(s) - productivity , agricultural economics , agriculture , economics , government (linguistics) , information asymmetry , farm income , business , natural resource economics , microeconomics , production (economics) , economic growth , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , biology
This article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers' productivity, a government objective to insure farmers a minimum “parity” income, an endogenous land rent, and diminishing returns on alternative (nonprogram crop) land uses. In this setting, acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy, although compensated acreage limits are. When there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs, optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation—or “buyout”—program in which high‐cost producers participate and low‐cost producers do not.