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Problems with the Seeing = Knowing Rule
Author(s) -
Friedman Ori,
Griffin Richard,
Brownell Hiram,
Winner Ellen
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
developmental science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.801
H-Index - 127
eISSN - 1467-7687
pISSN - 1363-755X
DOI - 10.1111/1467-7687.00308
Subject(s) - ignorance , false belief , psychology , theory of mind , neglect , observer (physics) , inference , cognitive psychology , task (project management) , social psychology , cognition , epistemology , artificial intelligence , computer science , physics , management , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , psychiatry , economics , philosophy
The view that children understand the mind via a coherent theory is supported by evidence that children rigidly follow a Seeing = Knowing Rule: seeing, and only seeing, leads to knowing. This paper presents two kinds of evidence that children do not follow this rule. First, we critically review previous findings that children neglect the role of inference and argue that these studies do not in fact support the view that children follow a Seeing = Knowing Rule. We then present two studies in which children who correctly attributed ignorance and false belief to an observer in a false belief task also attributed ignorance (Study 1) and false belief (Study 2) in true belief tasks. These findings demonstrate that children sometimes attribute ignorance and false belief to an observer who is granted visual access, an outcome that should not occur if children rigidly follow the Seeing = Knowing Rule. We end by discussing some problems associated with modifying the Seeing = Knowing Rule to account for children's failure on the true belief task.