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From synonyms to homonyms: exploring the role of metarepresentation in language understanding
Author(s) -
Garnham Wendy A.,
Brooks Julie,
Garnham Alan,
Ostenfeld AnneMarie
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
developmental science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.801
H-Index - 127
eISSN - 1467-7687
pISSN - 1363-755X
DOI - 10.1111/1467-7687.00137
Subject(s) - psychology , homonym (biology) , task (project management) , adjective , cognitive psychology , cognition , synonym (taxonomy) , false belief , point (geometry) , theory of mind , linguistics , noun , philosophy , botany , geometry , management , mathematics , neuroscience , economics , biology , genus
Doherty and Perner (Metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind: just two words for the same thing? Cognitive Development , 13 (1998), 279–305) report that children’s understanding of synonyms and false belief is dependent on an understanding of the representational mind. Experiment 1 extends this finding by examining children’s understanding of homonyms. Children aged 3 and 4 years were asked to judge whether a puppet correctly selected the second member of a homonym pair. Performance on this task was strongly associated with performance on the false belief task even after chronological and verbal mental age had been accounted for. Experiment 2 incorporated two new tasks: a synonyms task and an adjectives task. Understanding of synonyms and homonyms significantly predicted performance on the false belief task. However, once chronological age was accounted for, only performance on the homonyms task did so. The difficulty experienced on the homonyms task was not due to a reluctance to acknowledge that the puppet can point to a different picture when the the same word label is used twice. Children had no difficulty on the adjectives task when the puppet had to point to a different picture described using the same adjective. The suggestion that the understanding of synonyms, homonyms and false belief are related by a common insight into the representational mind is therefore not supported.