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Cost–raising Strategies in a Symmetric, Dynamic Duopoly
Author(s) -
Mason Robin
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
the journal of industrial economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.93
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1467-6451
pISSN - 0022-1821
DOI - 10.1111/1467-6451.00179
Subject(s) - raising (metalworking) , duopoly , incentive , set (abstract data type) , economics , computer science , microeconomics , mathematics , cournot competition , geometry , programming language
This paper provides a characterization of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise a common cost. The advantage of the dynamic analysis over existing static models is that it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organization: quantity and price adjustment, and learning–by–doing.