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Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?
Author(s) -
Rubinfeld Daniel L.,
Singer Hal J.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
the journal of industrial economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.93
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1467-6451
pISSN - 0022-1821
DOI - 10.1111/1467-6451.00151
Subject(s) - news aggregator , foreclosure , electrical conduit , broadband , competition (biology) , vertical integration , business , internet access , the internet , limiting , incentive , telecommunications , industrial organization , computer science , finance , economics , microeconomics , engineering , world wide web , mechanical engineering , ecology , biology
The merger of AOL and Time Warner involved a vertical combination of the largest Internet content provider and aggregator and a large cable system operator which offers a conduit through which broadband customers can access Internet content at high speeds. We consider the economic incentives of such a firm to engage in two distinct vertical foreclosure strategies: (1) conduit discrimination—insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting rival platform distribution of its affiliated content and services, and (2) content discrimination—insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content.