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State Buildng by Bargaining for Monopoly Rents
Author(s) -
Volckart Oliver
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
kyklos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.766
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-6435
pISSN - 0023-5962
DOI - 10.1111/1467-6435.00121
Subject(s) - economic rent , monopoly , feudalism , proposition , state (computer science) , politics , competition (biology) , economics , market economy , cartel , law and economics , bargaining power , political economy , economic system , political science , law , microeconomics , incentive , ecology , philosophy , epistemology , algorithm , computer science , biology
Starting from the proposition that the feudal political system functioned as a market for military security where no territorial monopolies and consequently no states in the modern sense of the word existed, state formation is here explained as the outcome of efforts to restrict competition in this market. The explanation draws on the theory of regulation which focuses on bargaining between interest groups and political authorities as the cause of the creation of entry barriers to markets. Which interest groups and authorities were concerned in late medieval and early modern state building is analyzed on the basis of three historical cases, two of which led to the creation of territorial monopolies of security while in one instance corresponding efforts failed.