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Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Author(s) -
Klemperer Paul
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
journal of economic surveys
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.657
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 1467-6419
pISSN - 0950-0804
DOI - 10.1111/1467-6419.00083
Subject(s) - common value auction , collusion , economics , revenue , mathematical economics , auction theory , revenue equivalence , simple (philosophy) , equivalence (formal languages) , microeconomics , section (typography) , computer science , mathematics , finance , philosophy , epistemology , discrete mathematics , operating system
This paper provides an elementary, non‐technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions , Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.); We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk‐aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi‐unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and a bibliography for each section.