Premium
The influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of financial reporting and auditing: Perceptions of auditors and directors in Singapore
Author(s) -
Goodwin Jenny,
Seow Jean Lin
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
accounting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.645
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1467-629X
pISSN - 0810-5391
DOI - 10.1111/1467-629x.t01-1-00074
Subject(s) - accounting , business , internal audit , audit , joint audit , chief audit executive , audit evidence , corporate governance , walk through test , external auditor , quality audit , information technology audit , auditor independence , audit committee , finance
This study uses two hypothetical cases to examine the perceptions of auditors and directors in Singapore about corporate governance practices relating to the quality of financial reporting and auditing. In the first case, the strength of the audit committee, the existence of an internal audit function and the strength of a corporate code of conduct were manipulated. All three variables were perceived to have some influence on financial reporting and audit quality. However, some interesting differences were found between the perceptions of auditors and directors. Auditors place more weight on the internal audit function, possibly due to their familiarity with the role that internal audit can play in reducing audit risk and enhancing controls. Directors have more confidence in board enforcement of a strong code of conduct, possibly reflecting the view that this encourages staff to adhere to higher ethical standards. In the second case, audit partner rotation, outsourcing of internal audit services and whether the audit firm audited all companies within a group were manipulated. Auditors believed that their ability to resist management pressure was enhanced when they audited all companies within the group. No significant differences were found for the other variables, suggesting that neither group believes that these practices impair audit independence.