Income Shifting and International Transfer Pricing: A Three‐Country Example

There is a long held belief that international transfer pricing (ITP) is used by multinational enterprises (MNEs) to minimize global tax liability. On the one hand, this is a rational economic response to market imperfections created by national governments. An alternative view decries such actions as anti‐competitive and an abuse of power. This article ex‐amines the potential benefit to enterprises of ITP manipulation when a real world combination of fiscal rules are simultaneously applied in practice. The countervailing impact of different national rules appears to result in ITP having a minor significance on parent after‐tax income. Differential rates cause minor benefits but the absence of a form of tax, such as withholding tax, can provide substantial opportunities to maximize global after‐tax income through the choice of transfer price. ITP can therefore provide benefits when national jurisdictions do not have consistent forms of taxation. In all the scenarios explored, major variations are apparent in the after‐tax income of subsidiaries operating under different combinations of fiscal regimes and ITP policies. The tension between head‐quarter and subsidiary management may be most pronounced when a subsidiary is located in a jurisdiction not having a complete range of tax forms.