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Philosophical assumptions in Freud, Jung and Bion: questions of causality
Author(s) -
Horne Michael,
Sowa Angela,
Isenman David
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
journal of analytical psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.285
H-Index - 23
eISSN - 1468-5922
pISSN - 0021-8774
DOI - 10.1111/1465-5922.00140
Subject(s) - psychoanalytic theory , conceptualization , psychoanalysis , philosophy , causality (physics) , schism , epistemology , determinism , metaphysics , teleology , enlightenment , psychology , law , quantum mechanics , politics , political science , linguistics , physics
The historical development of concepts of causality in philosophy is described. Since the Enlightenment and the growth of science, exponents of the two most important concepts, determinism and teleology, have been in conflict. At the inception of psychoanalysis at the end of the nineteenth century this conflict was particularly intense. It was the cause of the first major schism in psychoanalysis between Jung and Freud. Psychoanalytic theorists have continued to disagree over this issue. Post‐modernist philosophy has abolished all metaphysics and therefore called into question concepts of psychic causality. Parallel to, but uninfluenced by this development, Bion has developed a psychoanalytic conceptualization which may be seen as transcending causality. The clinical and theoretical implications of these developments are described.