Composition of Government Budget, Non‐Single Peakedness, and Majority Voting | Zendy

Bearse Peter | Zendy; Glomm Gerhard | Zendy; Janeba Eckhard | Zendy

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Composition of Government Budget, Non‐Single Peakedness, and Majority Voting

Author(s) -

Bearse Peter,

Glomm Gerhard,

Janeba Eckhard

Publication year - 2001

Publication title -

journal of public economic theory

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809

H-Index - 32

eISSN - 1467-9779

pISSN - 1097-3923

DOI - 10.1111/1097-3923.00079

Subject(s) - voting , public finance , economics , government (linguistics) , voting trust , composition (language) , government budget , microeconomics , majority rule , revenue , simple (philosophy) , property (philosophy) , tax revenue , public economics , monetary economics , econometrics , disapproval voting , macroeconomics , finance , political science , linguistics , philosophy , epistemology , politics , law

In this paper we study whether majority voting equilibria exist when preferences over public policies are not single peaked. The government levies a proportional income tax. Tax revenue is used to finance a uniform lump‐sum transfer and public education. Individuals vote on the composition of the government budget. We show that the single‐crossing property cannot be invoked to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium. In a simple parametric example we find that cycles are pervasive.

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