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Premium Population Monotonicity and Egalitarianism for Binary Social Choice Problems
Author(s)
Chun Youngsub
Publication year2001
Publication title
journal of public economic theory
Resource typeJournals
PublisherBlackwell Publishers
We consider the class of binary social choice problems. A society must choose one of two public projects, money being available to perform side payments and each agent having quasi‐linear preferences. Moulin (1987, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 , 769–783) formulates the problem and characterizes the egalitarian solution on the basis of agreement . This axiom requires that changes in the preferences of some members of the society should affect the agents whose preferences have not changed in the same direction; all gain or all lose. In this paper, we present an alternative characterization of the egalitarian solution on the basis of population monotonicity. This axiom requires that upon the arrival of new agents, all of the original agents should be affected in the same direction; all gain or all lose.
Subject(s)artificial intelligence , axiom , basis (linear algebra) , class (philosophy) , computer science , demography , econometrics , economics , egalitarianism , geometry , law , mathematical analysis , mathematical economics , mathematics , microeconomics , monotonic function , political science , politics , population , social choice theory , sociology
Language(s)English
SCImago Journal Rank0.809
H-Index32
eISSN1467-9779
pISSN1097-3923
DOI10.1111/1097-3923.00068

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