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Stable Provision vs. Cournot–Nash Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies
Author(s) -
Shitovitz Benyamin,
Spiegel Menahem
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/1097-3923.00063
Subject(s) - economics , cournot competition , consumption (sociology) , nash equilibrium , microeconomics , public good , core (optical fiber) , mathematical economics , economy , computer science , social science , sociology , telecommunications
Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998, Journal of Economic Theory 83 , pp. 1–18) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utility‐wise) to their Cournot–Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility‐wise, by all consumers over their Cournot–Nash consumption bundles.