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Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules
Author(s) -
Ehlers Lars,
Klaus Bettina
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/1097-3923.00060
Subject(s) - solidarity , probabilistic logic , pareto principle , mathematical economics , monotonic function , microeconomics , population , economics , pareto efficiency , majority rule , mathematics , computer science , statistics , artificial intelligence , sociology , political science , law , operations management , mathematical analysis , demography , politics
We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single‐peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and “solidarity” (population‐monotonicity or replacement‐domination) must equal a so‐called target rule.

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